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Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000600040011-3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Copy 8

8 JUL 1966

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Reconnaissance Office

SUBJECT: Utilization of U-2 Assets and Future U-2 Programs.

1. This memorandum is for information only. It is in response to the questions posed in the "Outline for Memorandum", subject as above, presented at the meeting held in [redacted] office on 5 July 1966.

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2. It is assumed that this material is to be used as background information for a future Executive Committee meeting to study the feasibility of a U-2R purchase.

3. If the material in this memorandum is to be incorporated in any other correspondence, request this office be included in the coordination routing.

[redacted]
Director of Reconnaissance, CIA

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Attachments:

- A - Present Program
- B - Present Inventory
- C - SAC Mod Program
- D - Present Agreement of Force Levels
- E - Present Operational Utilization
- F - Combining of Assets
- G - Present Status of U-2s assigned to AFSC
- H - U-2R Program
- I - Status of North Base - Edwards
- J - Recommended Approach to U-2 Program

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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SIGNATURE RECOMMENDED:

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[Redacted Signature]

Acting Director of Special Activities

CONCUR:

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[Redacted Signature]

in draft

Acting Deputy Director for Science and Technology

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SAS/OSA [Redacted] jw (8 July 66)

Distribution:

- 1&2-DNRO
- 3&4-D/R/CIA
- 5, 6&7-DD/S&T
- 8-D/SA
- 9-D/FA/OSA
- 10 -SAL/OSA
- 11 -RB/OSA

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[Redacted]

[REDACTED]
Attachment A

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QUESTION: What are the present CIA and SAC Programs utilizing the U-2 aircraft?

ANSWER:

1. CIA

a. Detachment G

(1) The detachment permanently located at Edwards Air Force Base, California, is required to maintain a dual staging capability to conduct covert reconnaissance missions worldwide.

(2) In addition to its primary mission, the detachment has the responsibility for the:

(a) Conduct of continuing development programs for new equipment.

(b) Development of air tactics.

(c) Training of new mission pilots, [REDACTED]

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(Effective August 1966) and Agency.

(3) All operational missions flown by Detachment G will launch/recover at an operating location other than Edwards AFB.

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
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Attachment A, Page 2



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2. Strategic Air Command

a. Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona: SAC U-2 aircraft are assigned to the Strategic Reconnaissance Wing at Davis-Monthan. This Wing provides personnel and materiel resources necessary

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[REDACTED]
Attachment A, Page 3

to conduct overt reconnaissance missions from other operating locations. At Davis-Monthan AFB, SAC maintains a proficiency flying program and is responsible for the transition training of SAC U-2 mission pilots.

b. Barksdale AFB, Louisiana: This detachment is responsible for conducting overt reconnaissance missions over Cuba.


c. [REDACTED] This detachment is responsible for conducting overt reconnaissance missions in Southeast Asia.

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
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Attachment B

QUESTION: What is the present inventory of U-2 aircraft?

ANSWER:

1. CIA



2 aircraft

Edwards

3 aircraft


Lockheed

1 aircraft

2. SAC

Barksdale

1 aircraft



2 aircraft

Davis-Monthan

5 aircraft

Lockheed

2 aircraft


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


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Attachment B, Page 2

Attrition of U-2 Aircraft by Year:

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YEAR	SAC		CIA	LAC
1955	0		0	0
1956	0		4	0
1957	4		0	1
1958	4		0	0
1959	0		0	0
1960	1		1	0
1961	0		2	0
1962	3		1	0
1963	1		1	0
1964	3		2	0
1965	0		3	0
1966	<u>1</u>		<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>
131 Months	17		17	1

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U-2 Attrition Rates by Organizations:

1 August 1955 - 1 July 1966 (11 years)

Overall - 1 each 3.74 months

* SAC - 1 each 6.7 months

CIA - 1 each 7.7 months

1 January 1962 - 1 July 1966 (4 1/2 years)

Overall - 18 Acft - 1 each 3 months

SAC - 8 Acft - 1 each 6.75 months

CIA - 10 Acft - 1 each 5.4 months

1 January 1965 - 1 July 1966 (18 months)

Overall - 7 Acft - 1 each 2.57 months

SAC - 1 Acft - 1 each 18 months

CIA - 6 Acft - 1 each 3 months

(AT START OF PROGRAM)

1 August 1955 - 1 January 1960 (53 months)

Overall - 13 Acft - 1 each 4 months

* SAC - 8 Acft - 1 each 4.5 months

CIA - 4 Acft - 1 each 13 months

LAC - 1 Acft

* Based on 1 January 1957 as start of SAC U-2 program.

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Attachment B, Page 4

U-2 Attrition Rates by Pilot Affiliation

(Excluding Operational Losses)

SAC (13-114 mos.) 1 each 10 months *

Agency (7-131 mos.) 1 each 19 months

(8-66 mos.) 1 each 8 months

Operational Losses - 6

Lockheed Loss - 1

* Based on 1 January 1957 as start of SAC U-2 program.

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Attachment C

QUESTION: What is the status of SAC modification schedule?

(for conversion to J-75) Contracted for seven with option for
ten. Have not approved option.

ANSWER:

Completed:

Acft 375

Acft 390

Acft 367

In Modification:

Acft 393 (Est. date of delivery 25 July 1966)

Acft 373 (Est. date of delivery 3 Oct 1966)

Programmed for modification:

	IN	OUT
Acft. 392	25 July 1966	14 November 1966
Acft. 347	3 October 1966	30 January 1967

Not yet contracted for

Acft 374

Acft 386

Acft 391

NOTE: A chart depicting the equipments installed in the present inventory of U-2s follows. Much of the equipment installed in the CIA aircraft is still incompatible with SAC aircraft due to major wiring differences principally.

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[REDACTED]
Attachment D

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QUESTION: What is the present agreement of force levels?

ANSWER:

1. The minimum requirement for the Agency is nine U-2 aircraft.

2. These nine aircraft would be utilized as follows:

a. [REDACTED] Three aircraft to be utilized per agreement

[REDACTED] for overflights, proficiency and training. (This includes proficiency and training for U. S. support personnel assigned.)

b. Edwards - North Base: Five aircraft to be utilized to maintain deployment capability and for pilot (U. S. [REDACTED] training. [REDACTED]

c. LAC: One aircraft for IRAN/testing purposes.


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


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Attachment E

QUESTION: What has been the Agency U-2 Utilization for the last year? For the first two quarters of calendar year 1965?

(See Following Chart)



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PROJECT FLYING HOURS (4 QTRS FY-66)

ART NBR	JULY	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	
342	37.5	45.0	20.9	5.7	10.7	15.1	45.8	39.7	(1)				
348	14.1	16.8	29.2	31.8	20.1	40.0	21.0	48.2	44.7	58.3	35.1	32.5	
349	26.7	4.6	16.7	16.7	7.4	23.1	11.1	13.9	20.5	MAINT	MAINT	25.6	
352	IRAN	46.9	31.5	25.1	(2)								
359	25.8	29.7	41.0	43.2	29.4	MAINT	MAINT	5.0	31.2	21.9	49.0	36.1	
372	44.8	13.9	16.9	60.1	46.3	22.7	5.1	28.1	(3)				
381	CONV	CONV	CONV	7.7	13.6	60.8	53.4	(4)	(4)	2.2	29.8	44.8	
383	34.0	29.0	26.6	19.4	38.6	38.6	22.0	13.8	30.8	38.1	30.1	7.8	
384	54.1	47.2	22.2	22.3	27.5	25.9	33.2	16.9	4.7	31.0	22.8	9.6 (7)	
385	28.3	MAINT	20.6	37.5	25.6	25.1	15.7	70.2	(5)	MAINT	10.6	7.7	
392							(6)	18.9	20.4				
	265.3	233.1	225.6	269.5	219.2	251.3	207.3	254.7	152.3	151.5	177.4	164.1	

1st Qtr FY-66 - 724.0 HRS.2nd Qtr FY-66 - 740.0 HRS.3rd Qtr FY-66 - 614.3 HRS.

Sub-total 2078.3 HRS.

4th Qtr FY-66 493.0 HRS.

2571.3 HRS.

(1) Lost 25 FEB '66

(2) Lost 21 OCT '65

(3) Lost 17 FEB '66

(4) Loan to FOG, 19 JAN '66

(5) Loan to FOG, 7 FEB '66

(6) Loan to Project, JAN '66

(7) Lost 21 JUN '66

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 DETACHMENT FLYING HOURS
 JAN-JUN-1965

ART NBR	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	
342	44.7	55.5	11.5	6.0	21.2	66.8	
348	16.7		12.4	64.9	14.8	8.4	
349	56.5	13.6		28.2			
352	11.4	45.4	42.7	6.1	13.9		
358	7.1						
359					59.6	32.7	
372					14.4	118.5	
381							
382		17.8	35.2	12.2			
384						109.0	
385		6.7	36.9	27.4	24.0	13.9	
TOTAL	136.4	139.0	138.7	144.8	147.9	349.3	

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Attachment F

QUESTION: Can present U-2 assets be combined into one pool?

ANSWER:

1. While it might be physically possible to combine Agency and SAC aircraft, personnel and other equipment at Davis-Monthan AFB, such pooling would pose the following problems:

a. Command and Control - Agency and SAC have two separate and distinct systems of command and control. Efficient operation will not permit two systems.

b. Because of different missions (overt vs covert) the aircraft would not be of similar configuration with the resulting problems of dual maintenance, supply, lack of interchangeability, etc.

c. Research and Development - The bulk of present U-2 research and development is done in the Agency QRC manner. This is completely different from present Air Force system.

d. Support Personnel - LAC technicians (civilian) required by the Agency are now permanently settled at the Edwards area. Movement of such personnel would pose a problem.

e. Pilots - Difference in compensation of Agency and USAF personnel stationed together may cause a morale problem for similar mission flying.

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f. Security:

(1) The security program for the present IDEALIST project consists of three primary responsibilities - physical, operational and personnel. We feel that physical security is the most compatible to the merging of assets since the military is believed capable of providing adequate protection of these assets by using guards and other physical protection methods.

(2) For over ten years the IDEALIST program has operated under a stringent personnel security system for all individuals connected with the program, i. e. U. S. Government and contractor representatives. The up-grading of the military U-2 program to meet our clearance and investigative standards would be impossible to accomplish within a reasonable period of time. To do otherwise would down-grade our project security so as to remove it from its present protective system. Another factor to be

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[REDACTED]

(3) Operational security presents another problem area should U-2 assets be merged. We differ from military U-2

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
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operations by use of special pilot recruiting and training techniques and the extraordinary protection afforded mission data, aircraft and personnel. The current military U-2 program is designed to provide tactical and strategic information of importance to the current combat situation. The degree of protection given military U-2 operations does not approach that which we provide for our reconnaissance capability.

2. Because of different configurations and different missions, the problem of priority assignment under a common pool poses a strong deterrent to combining these assets.




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4. From a purely operational standpoint there is no reason why SAC operations could not be extended into South China, Sino-Indian Border,  etc. However, the political problems associated with the use of military aircraft for covert overflight would vary in number and in degree, depending on the circumstances and the countries involved. In virtually all instances these problems would be substantial.

5. Assuming that an operation of this character could be conducted as securely by military units operating under military cover as by the

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


Attachment F, Page 4

Clandestine Service, and this is by no means certain, we are still faced with the problem of plausible denial of U. S. military responsibility in the event of a mishap or protest. If we conclude that the distinction between military and civilian control is irrelevant to the possibility of denial and therefore the vehicle is equally as useable for covert overflights by the regular military establishment as by CIA, then there is no problem.

6. Although this issue can be debated at great length, what is really important is the attitude of the political authorities of our Government. The decisive question is whether they still believe (rightly or wrongly) that the use of U-2 aircraft for overflights by the Clandestine Service will give rise to lesser risks of embarrassment or counteraction than their use by a military arm. This, traditionally, has been the attitude and policy and its reversal would have to stem from the highest political authority.

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Attachment G

QUESTION: What is the present status of the U-2s assigned to the
Air Force Systems Command?

NOTE: This question directed by NRO to AFRDR for an answer
on the status of the four aircraft presently assigned AFSC.



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
Attachment H

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U-2R PROGRAM

The NRO will answer this question themselves pertaining to the procurement schedule, costs, configuration, etc., based on information previously furnished the NRO by the Agency.

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Attachment I

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QUESTION: What is the status of North Base - Edwards?

ANSWER:


1. There is not sufficient space at Edwards Air Force Base to handle present SAC and Agency U-2 aircraft stationed in the United States.
2. When the U-2R aircraft become available to the Agency, they will be phased through Edwards AFB for testing, retention at the Edwards Detachment and deployment to [REDACTED] Based on the forecast U-2R production schedule, North Base at Edwards can handle this problem.
3. Manpower at Edwards North Base with the advent of the U-2R will pose no major problem. Both Air Force and LAC personnel in place can make the transition to the new aircraft as the U-2R becomes available.

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[REDACTED]

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Attachment J

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QUESTION: What is the Recommended Approach to the U-2 Program?

ANSWER:

1. Present Assets:

a. Recommend that three U-2 aircraft be transferred as soon as possible to the Agency. This will bring the Agency to the recommended level of nine aircraft.

b. Continue to modify SAC U-2 aircraft to the J-75 configuration.


2. U-2R

a. Assign first two U-2R aircraft to the Agency for flight test and training purposes.

b. Assign the next seven U-2R aircraft to the Agency replacing present assets.


c. As the Agency detachment becomes operationally ready in the U-2R aircraft, transfer present Agency U-2 aircraft to SAC.

d. As additional U-2R aircraft become available, assign them to SAC.



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Attachment J

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e. The above recommendations for assignment of U-2R aircraft is based on the following:

(1) Because of the overflight of denied territory requirement levied on the Agency, the more sophisticated aircraft should go first to the Agency.

(2) Because of the small numbers of aircraft initially involved, it is more economical to have a single unit (Agency) concerned with supply and maintenance of a new aircraft.

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